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Levent V. Orman
Cornell University
Malott Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-4201
orman@johnson.cornell.edu
Database management systems are the primary tools of automated bookkeeping [1, 7, 16,
23]. They are used to store and maintain a record of all business transactions, and also
create and maintain accounting data that are derived from those raw transactions. As in
manual bookkeeping systems, automated bookkeeping systems have to be monitored
carefully to maintain data quality. A large variety of errors can seep into organizational
databases, ranging from data entry errors to violations of accounting standards. In fact,
there is considerable evidence documenting the poor quality of data in organizational
databases [12, 19, 21]. It appears that although database systems have revolutionized
bookkeeping in terms of efficiency and speed, the ability to detect errors and maintain
quality has not kept pace.
The primary tool of database auditing is database integrity constraints [7, 8, 16, 23]. They
are logical statements that capture the semantics of data and the intent of the transactions.
They have to be satisfied by the database at all times for the data to be correct and
complete. They can be incorporated into the database through the data dictionary
facilities, or implemented as external views [4, 7, 9, 23]. Data dictionaries are constructs
designed to capture a description of the database, its valid states, and correct
transformations resulting from update transactions. They often contain integrity
constraints that capture the basic semantics of data using devices such as keys and
functional relationships. However, these constraints are often very limited in scope and
usually for human manual analysis rather than automatic enforcement. In their most
general form, integrity constraints can be maintained and enforced as external views that
contain integrity violations. These external views can be considered queries that are
executed on a continuous basis and return the data that cause violations of integrity.
There is one external view for each database constraint, and they are expected to be
empty so long as the database is in a correct state. They are monitored by the database
management system periodically, or even continuously, to ensure that they are empty [11,
17]. A continuous integrity monitoring and enforcement system appears more desirable
than a periodic system, but there are serious implementation problems. A continuous,
real-time integrity enforcement system requires the execution of all relevant integrity
constraints after each transaction that updates the database, to ensure that no violations
have resulted from the transaction. Few commercial systems can provide this level of
service due to the high cost of executing integrity constraints. Integrity constraints are
complex queries that are executed against very large databases, and executing a large
number of them after each transaction is a very costly undertaking. In fact, a real-time
integrity enforcement system for a large, highly active database can easily overwhelm the
system resources and bring it to a halt, or at least cause major unacceptable delays in the
processing of transactions [13, 15, 17, 20]. Such delays themselves are significant sources
of error in commercial databases due to obsolescence of data, making it impossible to

provide an error-free database. All commercial systems are forced to tolerate significant
levels of errors in their databases, and finding the optimum level is one objective of this
article. The evidence suggests that most commercial databases have very high error rates
[12, 19, 24]. Some actually have very little or no integrity enforcement, rendering the
database potentially unreliable. More importantly, most commercial database systems
provide no measurement and evaluation of errors and error rates for an effective
statistical quality control system for data [2, 3, 10, 14, 18].
There are three major approaches to database auditing and integrity enforcement. The
first is periodic enforcement where all integrity constraints are executed at the end of a
fixed period, and the errors and violations that have occurred during the period are caught
and corrected. The errors occur at random points in time during the period, and they are
carried in the system until the end of the period. Clearly, during the period, any queries
and reports involving the erroneous data will produce erroneous responses. The
determination of the optimum period is critical to this strategy to minimize the error rates
in the stored data. The optimum period may be different for each integrity constraint
depending on a variety of parameters such as the execution cost of the constraint, and the
error rates in the relevant incoming transactions. Clearly, high execution cost of a
constraint will lead to a longer optimum period, and larger error rates in the database will
have to be tolerated. Similarly, larger error rates in incoming transactions will lead to a
smaller optimum period, and larger execution costs for integrity constraints will have to
be tolerated.
The second approach is a transaction counting approach where the constraints are
executed after every n transactions. A transaction is an atomic update operation which
inserts, deletes, or modifies one record in the database. As in the previous approach, the
optimum selection of the number of transactions n is critical to the efficiency of this
approach, and to the minimization of error rates in the stored data. A special case of the
counting approach is the real-time continuous integrity enforcement where the integrity
constraints are executed after each transaction (n=1). A real-time continuous integrity
enforcement strategy is often considered ideal in the literature since it presumably allows
no errors in the system, albeit at great cost. We will show in section 4 that real-time
continuous integrity enforcement is rarely the optimum strategy even when we restrict the
objective to the minimization of error rates in the stored data. Very frequent execution of
the integrity constraints may actually increase the error rates in the stored data due to
delays it causes in executing transactions, and the consequent delays in keeping the
database up-to-date. Moreover, the strategy is often unfeasible due to the high execution
cost of integrity constraints as discussed in section 1.
The third approach is a variation on the real-time continuous integrity enforcement.
Under this approach integrity constraints are executed after each transaction, but not in
their full and complete form. A simplified version of each integrity constraint is executed
to test if a new error was introduced into the database by a given transaction, assuming
that the database was error free before the transaction [13, 17]. The restriction of the
constraint enforcement to a specific transaction leads to considerable simplification of
integrity constraints and actually makes a real-time continuous integrity enforcement a

feasible strategy. However, the simplification comes at a very high price: the execution of
all relevant integrity constraints after each transaction albeit in their simplified form,
since simplified constraints are only valid one-transaction at a time. Such frequent
execution of integrity constraints may actually increase the average error rates in the
stored data due to delays it causes in executing transactions and updating the database, as
discussed above.
The major tradeoff is between correctness and timeliness of data. Both may contribute to
the error rates in the database: one by entering incorrect data into the system, the other by
failure to update the data and hence causing it to lapse into obsolescence. Either
occurrence will be counted as an error, and the objective throughout this article will be to
minimize the error rates in the stored data, whether it is caused by the entry of new
erroneous data or by the failure to update the existing data. The failure to update is
commonly caused by the queuing of transactions as they wait for the processing of
previous transactions, and the execution of integrity constraints. The processing delays
are exacerbated by the locking of files during the execution of integrity constraints to
prevent interference from transactions. The possibility of interference between
transactions and integrity constraints is demonstrated by the following example.
Example 2.1: Consider a bank with savings and checking accounts, a customer with $100
in each account, a transaction by that customer transferring $100 from one account to the
other, and a constraint imposed on the bank database that requires each customer to
maintain $200 total in their combined savings and checking accounts. The transaction has
two major steps: T1 = withdrawal of $100 from one account, T2 = deposit of $100 into
the second account. The integrity enforcement has three steps: I1 = retrieval of the
account balance from the first account, I2 = retrieval of the account balance from the
second account, I3 = testing of the total ³ 200. If the transaction and the integrity
enforcement procedure are allowed to run concurrently, they can interfere with each
otherís operations and cause unpredictable results. Clearly, there is no violation of
integrity by this transaction since it merely transfers money from one account to the
other, but if the steps are executed in such a sequence to interfere with each other, a
violation may be indicated. Consider the sequence (T1, I1, I2, T2, T3) which will indicate
a violation since T1 will reduce one account balance by $100, and I1 and I2 will receive
account balances 0 and $100 with a total of $100 which is clearly less than $200, i.e., a
violation of the constraint. On the other hand, the sequences (T1, T2, I1, I2, I3) or (T1,
I1, T2, I2, I3) will both execute the integrity constraint correctly and cause no violations.
Clearly, update transactions can interfere with the execution of integrity constraints if
they are run concurrently. Consequently, during the execution of integrity constraints, the
relevant files are locked and no new updates are allowed to prevent interference between
the integrity enforcement procedure and the changing state of the database. The database
queries and report requests during this period can be answered, but only using a snapshot
of the database as it existed before the start of the enforcement procedure. New update
transactions arriving during the integrity enforcement are queued, and the system is
updated after the integrity enforcement is complete. Consequently, during the time of
integrity enforcement, the database becomes stale due to delays in processing the new

updates. This is a clear disadvantage of very frequent integrity enforcement, and it has to
be balanced against the cost of carrying errors in the system due to infrequent integrity
enforcement. The objective in this article is to determine the optimum balance between
these costs.
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